아렌트의 실재 개념
The Human Condition
“For us, appearance constitutes reality.” (The Human Condition, 50)
“Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a different position.” (57)
“This assumption is not a matter of course, and my use of the term vita activa presupposes that the concern underlying all its activities is not the same as and is neither superior nor inferior to the central concern of the vita contemplativa.” (17)
“The philosopher’s experience of the eternal, which to Plato was arrheton (“unspeakable”), and to Aristotle aneu logou (“without word”), and which later was conceptualized in the paradoxical nunc stans (“the standing now”), can occur only outside the realm of human affairs and outside the plurality of men […]” (20)
“For our trust in the reality of life and in the reality of the world is not the same. The latter derives primarily from the permanence and durability of the world, which is far superior to that of mortal life.” (120)
“In other words, against the subjectivity of men stands the objectivity of the man-made world rather than the sublime indifference of an untouched nature, whose overwhelming elementary force, on the contrary, will compel them to swing relentlessly in the circle of their own biological movement, which fits so closely into the over-all cyclical movement of nature’s household.” (137)
“The only character of the world by which to gauge its reality is its being common to us all, and common sense occupies such a high rank in the hierarchy of political qualities because it is the one sense that fits into reality as a whole our five strictly individual senses and the strictly particular data they perceive. It is by virtue of common sense that the other sense perceptions are known to disclose reality and are not merely felt as irritations of our nerves or resistance sensations of our bodies.” (208-209)
『과거와 미래 사이』
“만약 우리가 폴리스적 의미에서 정치적인 것을 이해한다면, 그것의 목적이나 존재 이유는 기교로서의 자유가 출현할 수 있는 공간을 설립하고 그것을 존재하게 하는 일이 될 것이다. 그것은 자유가 사람들이 청취할 수 있는 말, 감상할 수 있는 행위, 그리고 인간사라는 위대한 이야기책으로 마침내 편입되기에 앞서 회자되고, 기억되며, 이야기로 변하게 되는 사건들 속에서 그 실체를 알아볼 수 있는 모종의 세계적 실재로서 존재하는 공간이다. 이 외견의 공간에서 발생하는 것이라면 모두 정의상 정치적이다.” (「자유란 무엇인가」, 211)
아렌트와 카를 만하임 사이의 관계
Baehr, Peter. Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism, and the Social Sciences. Stanford University Press, 2010.
“In great intellects, a ruling passion is often complemented by an abiding antipathy. Arendt loathed the social sciences in general and sociology in particular. Her second published article was a review of Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1929), which she chastised for denying the autonomy of thought and for suggesting that philosophy’s traditional focus on ontological questions was less illuminating than was understanding the shifting finitude of everyday life, the alleged source of the philosopher’s categories. The tone throughout her essay on Mannheim is restrained, the language turgid, the subject recondite. Dissent is tempered by a spirit of intellectual generosity.” (3)
[위대한 지식으로, 지배하는 열정은 종종 보조적인 반감으로 보충된다. 아렌트는 전반적으로 사회과학을, 특히 사회학을 싫어했다. 그녀가 두 번째로 출간한 논문은 카를 만하임의 『이데올로기와 유토피아』(1929)에 대한 서평이었는데, 그 서평에서 아렌트는 사유의 자치를 거부한 것을, 그리고 존재론적 질문에 대한 철학의 전통적 집중이 일상적 삶으로 인한 유한성의 이동 즉 철학자의 범주들이라고 주장된 근원을 이해하는 일보다 덜 분명하다고 제시한 것을 비판했다. 만하임에 대한 아렌트의 서평에서 전반적인 어조는 제한됐고, 언어는 과장됐으며, 주제는 난해했다. 반대는 지적 관용의 정신으로 자제됐다.]
“These fundamental contrasts make a mockery of all attempts to equate religion and totalitarian ideology. Had they lived in our era, Marx and Engels would have castigated that elision, or so Arendt believed. The most problematic legacies of Marx and Engels lay elsewhere. Their impatient substitution of politics with violence— a mode of behavior that is essentially mute and antipolitical— proved to be contagious. Their pen-chant for metaphors of fabrication— the idea of “making history”— ominously likened human beings to the pliable material that a craftsman uses to create an object. Moreover, by describing religion as an emotional reflex of the life process, Marx suggested that nonscientific statements of human beings were inherently unreliable and untruthful. People were simply unaware of the real forces that determined their thoughts. Accordingly, Marx, together with Nietzsche (and Freud), helped to disseminate a mood of suspicion that pervades the human sciences and re-quires them to proceed by unmasking. Modern sociology, under the influence of Karl Mannheim, has aggravated this tendency by declaring that Marxism, too, is an ideology like any other. Arendt found this sleight of hand demeaning and, in its intellectual perversity, repugnant. To assume that when a person says he believes in God he is really saying something quite different is to reduce speech to the idiocy or insincerity of war propaganda. Similarly, to assert that when communists deny the existence of God and condemn the institution of religion they are really practicing a covert “secular religion” is again to ignore the reality of speech. The fact that some kinds of discourse hide ulterior motives does not mean that ulterior motives— or unconscious ones— are the norm. Speech also has a “truth- revealing” quality, and the principal challenge of rhetorical and textual analysis is to differentiate between statements that conceal reality and those that manifest it. Social science, alas, is abysmally incapable of rising to this challenge. On the contrary, its bowdlerized use of ideal- type analysis has taken the debunking orientation to absurd lengths by arranging discrete historical actors and episodes under completely arbitrary and transhistorical categories. A “good ex-ample of this thoroughly confusing method” is “Jules Monnerot, Sociology and Psychology of Communism.” Warming to her theme, Arendt directs her cannonade at both Monnerot and another familiar target— Karl Mannheim.
To take a convenient example, Max Weber coined his ideal type of the “charismatic leader” after the model of Jesus of Nazareth; pupils of Karl Mannheim found no difficulty in applying the same category to Hitler. From the viewpoint of the social scientist, Hitler and Jesus were identical because they fulfilled the same function. It is obvious that such a conclusion is possible only for people who refuse to listen to what either Jesus or Hitler said. Something very similar seems now to happen to the term “religion.” It is no accident, but the very essence of the trend which sees religions every-where, that one of its prominent adherents [ Jules Monnerot] quotes in a footnote, with approval, the astonishing discovery of one of his colleagues “that God is not only a late arrival in religion; it is not indispensable that he should come.” Here the danger of blasphemy, always inherent in the term “secular religion,” shows itself freely. If secular religions are possible in the sense that Communism is a “religion without God,” then we no longer live merely in a secular world which has banished religion from its public affairs, but in a world which has even eliminated God from religion— something which Marx and Engels still believed to be impossible.” (102-104)
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project_Qualia 